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I. INTRODUCTION
"[T]he Constitution protects us from our own best intentions."'
During times of grave emergency, the powers granted and reserved by
the federal government remain unaltered in order to avoid
shortsighted solutions that would, in the long run, be worse than the
1. New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 187 (1992).
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current crisis. 2 Even a simple cure for appreciable suffering may have
larger implications, and the rule of law does not know whether it is
constraining good or aiding evil.
In the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina, the most costly natural
disaster in U.S. history,3 the Federal Communications Commission
("FCC") imposed a shortsighted resolution that tested the boundaries
of its authority. Under previously unused powers to prevent the
"warehousing, hoarding, and brokering of toll-free numbers,"4 the FCC
unilaterally transferred one private party's phone number to another
private party, without offering any form of compensation.5 An
entrepreneur had originally registered the number, 1-800-RED-
ARMS, for his company of the same name. 6 When the number's use
increased during earthquakes, tornadoes, and floods, he realized his
2. See Home Bldg. & Loan Ass'n v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398, 425 (1934). Chief Justice
Hughes stated:
Emergency does not create power. Emergency does not increase granted
power or remove or diminish the restrictions imposed upon power granted or
reserved. The Constitution was adopted in a period of grave emergency. Its
grants of power to the Federal Government and its limitations of the power of
the States were determined in the light of emergency and they are not
altered by emergency.
Id.
3. See Eric Lipton, A View of the Political Storm After Katrina, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 4, 2005, §
1, at 39 (stating that Hurricane Katrina was "the most costly natural disaster in United States
history"); Letter from George W. Bush, President of the United States, to Dennis Hastert,
Speaker of the House of Representatives (Sept. 1, 2005), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov
/news/releases/2005/09/20050901-6.html (requesting funds for emergency relief for "one of the
worst natural disasters in our country's history").
4. In re Toll Free Serv. Access Codes, 20 F.C.C.R. 15,089, 4, at 15,090 (Sept. 2, 2005)
[hereinafter FCC Order]. The FCC also claims authority under an administration regulation
stating that toll free numbers are to be assigned "on a first-come, first-served basis unless
otherwise directed by the Commission." 47 C.F.R. § 52.111 (2007) (emphasis added). In addition,
the FCC has the authority to waive its rules if "good cause" is shown and if "strict compliance" of
the rule would be "inconsistent with the public interest." 47 C.F.R. § 1.3 (2007); Ne. Cellular Tel.
Co. v. FCC, 897 F.2d 1164, 1166 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (summarizing the holding of WAIT Radio v.
FCC, 418 F.2d 1153 (D.C. Cir. 1969)). Most recently, the District of Columbia Circuit declared
that the FCC's waiver policy was "outrageous, unpredictable, and unworkable... [and]
susceptible to discriminatory application," and therefore vacated the FCC's waiver of rule for a
cellular radio lottery because there were no standards by which to measure the waiver policy. Ne.
Cellular Tel. Co., 897 F.2d at 1167.
5. See Kevin Poulsen, Red Cross Gets Squatter's Number, WIRED, Sept. 7, 2005,
http://www.wired.com/news/technology[hurricane/1,68774-O.html (discussing the FCC's
confiscation of 1-800-RED-CROSS without compensation to the owner); FCC Order, supra note 4,
at 15,091 (noting that the American Red Cross, not the FCC or federal government, "has
represented that it will reimburse [the entrepreneur] for the reasonable costs of relinquishing
this number").
6. The entrepreneur, Steve Parker, "claims he acquired the phone number after founding a
company called Red Arms." Poulsen, supra note 5. However, the Red Cross and FCC believe
Parker, who founded 800-Ideas.com and admittedly "make[s] [a] living off of phone numbers that
spell words," is a "corporate digi-squatter." Id.
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fateful overlap: 1-800-RED-ARMS has the same underlying keypad
sequence as 1-800-RED-CROSS (1-800-733-2767). 7  During
emergencies, the entrepreneur voluntarily routed calls to local
American Red Cross chapters, charging only reimbursement costs.
8
Failed negotiations to transfer the number permanently (the charity
had steadfastly refused to pay six figures)9 led the Red Cross to make
an emergency request to the FCC. In the wake of Hurricane Katrina,
which "propelled the Red Cross into its largest U.S. relief effort in
history,"10 the FCC intervened and ordered that the number be
reassigned to the Red Cross."
It is not immediately obvious whether Red Arms has any legal
protection for the loss of its telephone number. Although courts
generally recognize intellectual property rights in vanity telephone
numbers, the Red Arms example does not implicate digi-squatting or
trademark infringement laws, as Red Arms' primary intention was not
to profit from public confusion.12 Red Arms neither purported to be the
Red Cross nor attempted to collect donations.' 3 Rather, this situation
involves the rights to a phone number's underlying digits, 733-2767,
separate from its alpha-numeric "RED-ARMS" mnemonic. The FCC
and the majority of courts, however, fail to recognize any ownership
rights in the underlying number itself. As a result, traditional Takings
Clause jurisprudence is inapplicable, and phone numbers and similar
forms of intangible interests generally lack the constitutional
protection given to established forms of property.
Most scholarship on the Takings Clause deals with its conduct
aspect, and legal journals are filled with commendable efforts to
determine the point at which a government regulation becomes a
compensable taking. This Note, however, concentrates on the property
aspect of the Takings Clause and attempts to determine the point at
7. The second "S" in Red Cross is ineffectual. Once the seven-digit phone number is dialed,
the call connects and any extra numbers dialed serve no purpose. See Am. Airlines v. 1-800-A-M-
E-R-I-C-A-N Corp., 622 F. Supp. 673, 676 (N.D. Ill. 1985) (finding that the eight letter "N" in 1-
800-American "superfluous to a seven-digit telephone number").
8. Poulsen, supra note 5. The American Red Cross used the phone number 1-800-HELP-
NOW (1-800-435-7669). Id.
9. See id. (" 'They were talking about the kinds of money that changed hands for 1-800-
FLOWERS, which is ridiculous.' " (quoting Chuck Connor, Senior Vice President of
Communication and Marketing for the American Red Cross)).
10. Id.
11. FCC Order, supra note 4, at 15,091 ("It is ordered... that Database Service
Management, Inc.... reassign the toll-free number that spells 1-800-RED-CROSS (1-800-733-
2767) to the national chapter of the American Red Cross for a period of one year.").
12. Digi-squatting involves profiting from another's trademark by purporting to be
affiliated. See infra Part II.B.3.
13. See Poulsen, supra note 5.
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which an intangible interest becomes compensable "private property"
under the Fifth Amendment. 14 In particular, this Note focuses on
emerging, intangible property interests such as phone numbers,
domain names, screen names, and email addresses, collectively
dubbed "entity locators," 15 which are not recognized as property under
conventional legal doctrines or FCC regulations. This Note addresses
the question of whether the term "property" in the Takings Clause
embodies these interests.
Granting property-like protection to intangible rights is neither
intuitive nor instinctive, and the Red Arms example illustrates the
logical snag. On the one hand, because the Fifth Amendment ensures
just compensation for sovereign "taking" of "private property,"
reasonable limiting principles are necessary in order to encourage
desirable government regulation without bankrupting the national
treasury.16 First, it may be costly to identify and compensate for rights
that are transient and indefinite, as many intangible interests are.' 7
Second, when too many interests are implicated by the Takings
Clause the government only loses since there is no reciprocal "Givings"
Clause, and the government does not impose a tax to capture external
benefits from its value-increasing regulations. 8 On the other hand,
perhaps the Fifth Amendment should be triggered by such intangible
property interests because the Takings Clause purports to prohibit
exactly the sort of government conduct in which the FCC participated:
a blatant redistribution of resources from one private party to
another.' 9 The Takings Clause demands compensation when the
14. In the Red Arms example, it is easy to see that the government action was an actual
deprivation of an interest rather than a more ambiguous diminishing of value.
15. J. Theodore Smith, Note, "1-800-RIPOFFS.COM Internet Domain Names Are the
Telephone Numbers of Cyberspace, 1997 U. ILL. L. REV. 1169, 1191.
16. U.S. CONST. amend. V. If the government was obligated to compensate for every
regulation that diminished an individual's property value, the government would have little
incentive to regulate for the public good. See GEOFFREY R. STONE ET AL., CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
971 (4th ed. 2001) (stating that all government action diminishes property value, and
compensation in these instances would result in far less redistribution).
17. For example, compensating Red Arms for its "property," a mere phone number, might
lead to a parade of horribles, where too many intangible interests fall within the scope of the
Takings Clause. Recognizing phone numbers as a form of property under the Takings Clause
could lead to an undue broadening of the Takings Clause if additional intangible interests are
recognized, such as certain screen names or instant messages.
18. See STONE ET AL., supra note 16, at 971-72 (commenting that "many people are 'winners'
from regulation" but are not taxed for these winnings). For example, if the government imposed
an anti-pollution regulation that resulted in increased property value, landowners would not be
required to compensate the government.
19. Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 386, 388-89 (1798). In Calder, the Court stated:
[A] law that takes property from A and gives it to B: It is against all reason
and justice, for a people to entrust a Legislature with SUCH powers; and,
therefore, it cannot be presumed that they have done it. The genius, the
20071 671
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government forces a private person to benefit the public, and
therefore, Red Arms arguably deserves compensation for its loss.
20
One stumbling block for judges and academics alike in
determining whether intangible interests deserve protection has been
evaluating the importance (or lack thereof) of "entity locator" rights.
21
In the Red Arms example, pragmatically speaking, did someone at the
FCC actually believe that a phone number was necessary to control
the crisis? Was it such an ordeal to look up the Red Cross in a phone
book?22 More importantly, does a state have authority to "take" a
seemingly inconsequential right, ever?
When new technology emerges, a judicial struggle ensues
between tendencies to apply established legal doctrine strictly and
impulses to expand the law to promote fairness. In the realm of phone
numbers, many courts have attempted to resolve the FCC's rigid,
ownership-denying regulation scheme by granting property-type
protections on an ad hoc basis. The first objective of this Note is to
explain the current state of statutory and common law surrounding
phone numbers. Part II provides a brief overview of the stature of
property in the Takings Clause and conventional ownership rights in
phone numbers as determined by FCC regulations and the doctrines of
contract and intellectual property law. In addition, Part II presents
the points of conflict between the established law and consumer
expectations created by emerging and evolving applications of phone
numbers. Part III analyzes two contemporary approaches to
regulating ownership rights in phone numbers and their
corresponding drawbacks. Finally, Part IV outlines a novel judicial
approach to the problem that adheres not only to the objective of the
FCC's administration of phone numbers, but also to consumer
nature, and the spirit, of our State Governments, amount to a prohibition of
such acts of legislation; and the general principles of law and reason forbid
them. The Legislature may enjoin, permit, forbid, and punish; they may
declare new crimes; and establish rules of conduct for all its citizens in future
cases; they may command what is right, and prohibit what is wrong; but they
cannot.., violate the right of... private property. To maintain that our
Federal, or State, Legislature possesses such powers, if they had not been
expressly restrained; would, in my opinion, be a political heresy, altogether
inadmissible in our free republican governments.
Id.
20. See STONE ET AL., supra note 16, at 973 (discussing how individuals should be
compensated when they are forced to do a public good as opposed to prevented from doing a
public harm).
21. See Smith, supra note 15, at 1191 ("In order for a domain name to acquire trademark
rights, it must be used as a source identifier and not just as an entity locator." (citation omitted)).
22. Or was it such an ordeal to look up the Red Cross in a newspaper or the bottom-line
news ticker of television coverage, both of which liberally publicized 1-800-HELP-NOW as a way
to telephone the Red Cross?
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expectations and the protections (and limitations) central to the
Constitution.
II. THE LEGAL CONTEXT OF INTANGIBLE TAKINGS
A. Constitutional Protection of Private Property
Concerned with government tyranny, the Framers of the
Constitution included two clauses to protect an individual's property
from government interference. The first, the Takings Clause, imposes
two important limitations on the government's ability to take private
property: 1) the taking must be for "public use," and 2) the
government must pay "just compensation. ' 23 The second, the Due
Process Clause, adds that any deprivation of property requires "due
process of law."24 The Founders believed that protecting an
individual's property is the primary means of protecting individuals
from the threats of excess and oppression by the majority, and
included the Takings Clause their Bill of Rights. 25 According to James
Madison, "The Takings Clause was designed to limit the sovereign's
prerogative to exercise the eminent domain power;" in other words, it
was designed to constrain the ability of the majority to "trample on the
rights of minorities."26 Thus, certain government redistributions are
deemed inappropriate, such as pure wealth transfers-taking from A
in order to benefit B-supported "only by a preference for B, or by B's
political power. '27 The Takings Clause aspires to "limit the
government's incentive to arbitrarily take the property of the populace
by putting a price tag on it."28 Effectively, the state should take
property only when its people are willing to pay a fair price for it,
ensuring that the taking will occur for the common good.29
23. U.S. CONST. amend. V ("[Nlor shall private property be taken for public use, without
just compensation.").
24. Id. ("No person shall ... be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of
law.").
25. Shubha Ghosh, Toward a Theory of Regulatory Takings for Intellectual Property: The
Path Left Open After College Savings v. Florida Prepaid, 37 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 637, 666-68
(2000).
26. Id. at 668. Some modern scholars, such as Professor Richard Epstein, believe property
"is the primary surrogate and measure of individual liberty" and that the purpose of the Takings
Clause is "to protect individual liberty." Id.
27. STONE ETAL., supra note 16, at 960.
28. Daniel R. Cahoy, Treating the Legal Side Effects of Cipro®: A Reevaluation of
Compensation Rules for Government Takings of Patent Rights, 40 AM. BUS. L.J. 125, 142 (2002).
29. Id.
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In order to invoke the protections of the Property Clauses, a
party must meet the threshold requirement of having a cognizable
interest in "property." The technological revolution has contrived new
property interests that do not fit neatly into any traditionally
protected property forms, highlighting the interesting question: What
types of emerging interests does the Takings Clause protect?
1. Defining Property in the Takings Clause
"Property" is a comprehensive word; it refers not only to things
that are objects of ownership, but it also applies to the rights that a
person may acquire in things.30 The term designates "an aggregate of
rights which are guaranteed and protected by the government."
31
Courts have held that a property interest is "the right to possess, use,
and dispose of' a tangible or intangible thing,32 and "to exclude
everyone else from interfering with it." 33 More succinctly, the term
property denotes "any vested right of any value."
34
The meaning of "property" is not consistent throughout the
Constitution, and this Note explores the meaning of "property" only
under the Takings Clause. 35 The Supreme Court has held that
legislatures or courts, but not the Constitution, create interests in
Takings property. Moreover, to ascertain whether an interest or
expectancy amounts to cognizable property is a two-step process.
First, a court will find the definition of that interest in state law, and
next determine whether its properly construed scope and meaning
30. 73 C.J.S. Property § 1 (2005).
31. Clance v. Clance, 127 S.W.3d 716, 723 (Mo. Ct. App. 2004).
32. Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986, 1003 (1984).
33. Consol. Constr. Servs. Inc. v. Simpson, 813 A.2d 260, 269 (Md. 2002) (quoting BLACK'S
LAW DICTIONARY 1216 (6th ed. 1998)).
34. Aranda v. Indus. Comm'n, 11 P.3d 1006, 1010 (Ariz. 2000) (quoting Rio Rico Props. v.
Santa Cruz County, 834 P.2d 166, 174 (Ariz. Bd. Tax App. 1992)).
35. A pragmatist might suggest giving the same word the same meaning throughout a
single document; however, the term "property" has not received that treatment in its
appearances throughout the Constitution. The meaning of property in the Takings Clause is
generally recognized to be a narrower definition than its meaning in the Due Process Clause.
Compare Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 262 n.8 (1970) (finding that welfare benefits fit within
the definition of property for procedural due process purposes) with Richardson v. Belcher, 404
U.S. 78, 80 (1971) (finding that "the analogy drawn in Goldberg between social welfare and
'property' cannot be stretched to impose a constitutional limitation on the power of Congress to
make substantive changes in the law of entitlement to public benefits") and Bowen v. Gilliard,
483 U.S. 587, 605 (1987) (finding that welfare benefits are not "protected property rights;"
therefore, if the government reduces the benefits it "does not constitute a taking of private
property without just compensation"); see also Thomas W. Merrill, The Landscape of
Constitutional Property, 86 VA. L. REV. 885, 955-58 (2000) (discussing the differences between
the definition of "property" under the Takings Clause and the Due Process Clause).
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includes the characteristics of "property under the Takings Clause,"
dubbed "constitutional property."36 In College Savings Bank v. Florida
Prepaid Postsecondary Education Expense Board, for example, the
Supreme Court held that the "hallmark" characteristic of
'constitutional property" is that it includes "the right to exclude
others."37
Courts have long recognized intangible property as a viable
property interest,38 and eminent domain jurisprudence has held that
the Takings Clause protects intangible property. 39 In Ruckelshaus v.
Monsanto, the Supreme Court held that "commercial data" in the form
of a trade secret constituted property subject to a governmental taking
because it was exclusive. 40 Moreover, the Court held that the
extension of Takings rights from tangible to intangible property was a
rational move since the "notion of property ... extends beyond land
and tangible goods and includes the products of an individual's 'labour
and invention.' "41 Next, the majority opinion acknowledged that "to
the extent" that the plaintiff had an interest in his data "as a trade-
secret property right under Missouri law[,] that property is protected
by the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment." 42 Therefore, when
recognized by state or federal laws, intangible property may constitute
property under the Takings Clause.
36. See Merrill, supra note 35, at 945.
37. Coll. Say. Bank v. Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd., 527 U.S. 666, 673
(1999) ("The hallmark of a protected property interest is the right to exclude others. That is 'one
of the most essential sticks in the bundle of rights that are commonly characterized as
property.' "). It is worth noting that in Board of Regents of State Colleges v. Roth, the Supreme
Court held that property constitutes "those claims upon which people rely in their daily lives."
408 U.S. at 577 (interpreting the Due Process Clause).
38. For more than a century, intangible interests have been found to constitute property.
See, e.g., W. River Bridge Co. v. Dix, 47 U.S. (6 How.) 507, 534 (1848) (franchise rights); Dodds v.
Shamer, 663 A.2d 1318, 1324 (Md. 1995) (liquor license); Simpson v. Jersey City Contracting Co.
58 N.E. 896, 898 (N.Y. 1900) (shares of stock); Menefee v. Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc., 329 A.2d
216, 220 (Pa. 1974) (broadcasting personality of a radio host).
39. See, e.g., Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986, 1003 (1984) (holding that a trade
secret constitutes property under the Takings Clause); Kimball Laundry Co. v. United States,
338 U.S. 1, 11 (1949) ("[T]he intangible acquires a value to a potential purchaser no different
from the value of the business" physical property. Since the Fifth Amendment requires
compensation for the latter, the former, if shown to be present and to have been 'taken,' should
also be compensable.").
40. Ruckelshaus, 467 U.S. at 1011. The Court in Ruckelshaus stated:
With respect to a trade secret, the right to exclude others is central to the
very definition of the property interest. Once the data that constitute a trade
secret are disclosed to others, or others are allowed to use those data, the
holder of the trade secret has lost his property interest in the data.
Id.
41. Id. at 1003.
42. Id. at 1003-04.
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2. Absence of Qualifying Test for Intangible Property Interests
Property is a dynamic concept, "evolv[ing] over time in
response to changing technologies and changing levels of supply and
demand."43 Regrettably, Supreme Court Takings jurisprudence has
failed to acknowledge a definitive test or rule to determine when
emerging, intangible rights amount to "property" under the Takings
Clause. As a result, courts and legislatures, afraid to depart from
established legal doctrine, struggle to keep pace with innovations in
technology. Consequently, emerging property interests may fail to
receive appropriate protection.
B. Traditional Law Affords No Property Interest in Phone Numbers
Administrative agency regulations refuse to recognize property
rights in a subscriber's underlying telephone number. 44 Giving effect
to the agency rules, courts have recognized only limited subscriber
rights in telephone numbers, using two different approaches. Under
the first approach, courts use the law of contracts to determine a
subscriber's rights, as telephone numbers are the product of service
agreements between telephone companies and subscribers. Under the
second approach, courts view vanity telephone numbers as a form of
intellectual property that is protected from trademark infringement
and unfair competition under both state common law45 and the federal
Lanham Trademark Act.
46
1. FCC Rules Governing Ownership of Phone Numbers
FCC regulations do not give subscribers any property rights in
their phone numbers. The FCC's Notice of Proposed Rule Making
denies that the "assignment of a number implies ownership, 47 and
states that a subscriber's intellectual property trademark rights in her
vanity number "does not imply the existence of any ownership interest
in the underlying number."48 The FCC seemingly provides subscribers
43. Merrill, supra note 35, at 945.
44. In re Toll Free Service Access Codes, Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 10 F.C.C.R.
13,692, 37, at 13,702 (Oct. 5, 1995), available at http://www.fcc.gov/Bureaus/Common_Carrier/
Notices/1995/fcc95419.html#Footnote%2085,%200Paragraph%2037 [hereinafter Notice of
Proposed Rulemaking].
45. See, e.g., Dial-A-Mattress Franchise Corp. v. Page, 880 F.2d 675, 678 (2d Cir. 1989);
Murrin v. Midco Commc'ns, Inc., 726 F. Supp. 1195, 1200 (D. Minn. 1989).
46. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1051-1127 (1996).
47. Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, siipra note 44, 37, at 13,702.
48. Id. 37, at 13,703.
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a right-of-number retention by guaranteeing the fair allocation of toll-
free phone numbers under 47 C.F.R. § 52.111 (the
Telecommunications Act), which states that vanity numbers are to be
given out on a first-come, first-served basis.49 However, § 1.7
authorizes the FCC to waive its rules for good cause.50 The actual
implications of such authority, nevertheless, appear uncertain. In
Northeast Cellular Telephone Co. v. FCC, for example, the D.C. Circuit
held that the FCC had no authority to waive its rule granting a license
to a cellular radio lottery winner because the waiver policy lacked
appreciable standards, and therefore, "was "outrageous,
unpredictable, and unworkable... [and] susceptible to discriminatory
application."
51
In addition, the FCC refuses to let subscribers transfer their
phone numbers to one another. More specifically, the FCC bans the
"hoarding" and "brokering" of numbers. 52 Hoarding is acquiring more
numbers than the subscriber intends to use, and brokering is selling
the extra numbers for a fee.5 3 The driving force behind this FCC policy
is fear of a property-like grab for vanity phone numbers.5 4 As more
numbers are registered, the FCC must open additional toll-free codes,
and "[i]t is "time consuming and costly for the industry to perform the
necessary modifications to the network so that it can support calls
using the new code." 55 In addition, hoarded phone numbers are
stagnant and unused and thus inefficient. 56 Furthermore, the FCC
believes that "brokering" numbers is against public interest. Allowing
the sale of phone numbers would encourage hoarding them, leading to
faster depletion.5 7 The FCC has also found that when subscribers
transfer numbers to one another, it "interferes with the orderly
allocation of numbering resources."58
49. Toll Free Number Assignment, 47 C.F.R. § 52.111 (1998).
50. Id.
51. Ne. Cellular Tel. Co. v. FCC, 897 F.2d 1164, 1167 (D.C. Cir. 1990).
52. 47 C.F.R. § 52.107 (1996); In re Toll Free Service Access Codes, Notice of Proposed
Rulemaking, 12 F.C.C.R. 11,162, 38, at 11,189 (Apr. 4, 1997), available at
http://www.fcc.gov/Bureaus/CommonCarrier/Orders/1997/fcc97123.txt (last visited Jan. 17,
2007) [hereinafter Second Report and Order].
53. Second Report and Order, supra note 52, 33, 36, at 11,189.
54. Karl M. Manheim & Lawrence B. Solum, An Economic Analysis of Domain Name
Policy, 25 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J. 359, 385 (2003) (discussing an analogous 'land rush' for
the easy-to-remember domain names").







Traditional legal doctrine provides that a person does not own
the telephone number assigned to him. 59 Instead, a subscriber has a
contractual right to use the number for a specified period through a
service agreement with the local phone company.60 A subscriber's
interest in a phone number is limited to the contractual rights
between the subscriber and the provider because courts view phone
numbers as inextricably woven into the service contract.61 Stated
differently, courts that apply contract law treat the individual phone
number as merely part of the whole contract for service, which cannot
"existo separate from its respective service that created it and that
maintains its continued viability."
62
Under a traditional contract law approach, the sole remedial
right available to subscribers comes in the form of contract damages
arising from a breach by the service provider. However, most service
contracts allow providers to change their subscribers' telephone
numbers without facing liability to the subscribers. For example, in
First Central Service Corp. v. Mountain Bell Telephone, the plaintiff
sued Mountain Bell Telephone for conditioning the plaintiffs retention
of the existing phone number of the business it had just purchased on
paying the outstanding charges of the previous owner.63 The New
Mexico appellate court held that based on the service contract,
64
Mountain Bell "had an absolute right to discontinue service" because
the subscriber "knows that Mountain Bell may change the telephone
number whenever it considers it desirable in the conduct of its
business."65
This contract-for-services approach contains several
deficiencies. First, a subscriber's rights are limited to those rights
stated in the service agreement with the phone company and provided
59. See, e.g., Jahn v. 1-800-Flowers.com, Inc., 284 F.3d 807, 810 (7th Cir. 2002).
60. See id. at 810-11 ("[Clarriers could change numbers without liability to the
subscribers.").
61. See Network Solutions, Inc. v. Umbro Int'l, Inc., 529 S.E.2d 80, 87 (Va. 2000).
62. Id. ("We are cognizant of the similarities between a telephone number and an Internet
domain name and consider both to be products of contracts for services. In our opinion, neither
one exists separate from its respective service that created it and that maintains its continued
viability." (citations omitted)).
63. First Cent. Serv. Corp. v. Mountain Bell Tel., 623 P.2d 1023, 1024-25 (N.M. Ct. App.
1981).
64. Id. ('The subscriber has no property right in the telephone number nor any right to
continuance of service through any particular central office, and the Telephone Company may
change the telephone number or central office designation of a subscriber whenever it considers it
desirable in the conduct of its business." (emphasis in original)).
65. Id. at 1025.
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by common law contract principles. Therefore, the subscriber's
abilities to use, hold, transfer, and alienate the telephone number
remain at the mercy of the provisions of the service agreement. In
addition, a contractual right cannot be asserted by or against a third
party not in privity with the telephone company. 66  Second,
inconsistent contract provisions generally lead to disparate judicial
treatment of telephone numbers and increased litigation and
administrative costs, as lawyers and courts are continually required to
interpret new and different provisions. In addition, idiosyncrasies in
contract provisions increase transaction costs for third parties, such as
potential phone service purchasers, who are required to research and
compare contracts to find the terms that best meet their needs.
67
3. Intellectual Property Law
In the context of consumer confusion over two ostensibly
similar vanity telephone numbers, courts invoke an analysis under
trademark law.68 Trademark law ignores the underlying number and
instead protects the mnemonic spelled out in the vanity number. The
common law of trademarks gives priority (senior user) rights to the
first individual to use the mark in commerce against all subsequent
(junior) users. 69 In order to qualify for protection, the mark must
either be a descriptive mark that has acquired a secondary meaning or
be inherently distinctive. 70 To establish trademark infringement, a
plaintiff needs to prove ownership of a valid mark and a likelihood of
confusion.71 The confusion standard is satisfied if "the public believes
that 'the mark's owner sponsored or otherwise approved the use of the
66. See Anupam Chander, The New, New Property, 81 TEX. L. REV 715, 774 (2003).
67. The need to compare service agreements arises from increased technology in the
telecom market, which has allowed new and competing service providers. Today, for example, a
savvy consumer might compare their local telephone company's offer with that from commercial
(e.g., Vonage) and proprietary (e.g., skype.com) VoIP providers.
68. Note that in the Red Arms example, the vanity numbers were different (1-800-RED-
ARMS and 1-800-RED-CROSS). Rather, the underlying telephone numbers were the same and
that is what led to consumer confusion. Poulsen, supra note 5.
69. Diana Lock, Toll-Free Vanity Telephone Numbers: Structuring a Trademark
Registration and Dispute Settlement Regime, 87 CAL. L. REV 371, 395-96 (1999) ("The common
law automatically provides ownership without registration when a person uses an inherently
distinctive mark in trade or commerce, or a descriptive mark acquires secondary meaning. An
individual obtains priority of rights in a mark by becoming a senior user, or the first to use the
mark in commerce." (citation omitted)).
70. Id. at 395.
71. Murrin v. Midco Commc'ns, Inc., 726 F. Supp. 1195, 1199 (D. Minn. 1989); The Lanham
Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) (2005); see also Lock, supra note 69, at 394 (discussing that the aim of
trademark law is "to prevent consumer confusion as to the origin of goods and to allow
consumers to identify and acquire the goods that they desire").
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trademark.' "72 In sum, under a trademark theory, courts grant the
subscriber a priority of rights to have his telephone number mnemonic
protected from any subsequent users of a similar phone number
mnemonic, where sufficient marketplace confusion exists.
For example, in American Airlines v. 1-800-A-M-E-R-I-C-A-N
Corp., a federal district court held that American Airlines could enjoin
a travel reservation service from using 1-800-AMERICA (1-800-263-
7422), which it had advertised as 1-800-AMERICAN under the
category "airline companies" in a telephone directory. 73 Because the
defendant intentionally used American Airlines's marks in order to
falsely promote itself as an affiliate of American Airlines and create
customer confusion in the airline travel marketplace, the defendant
had violated the federal trademark statute known as the Lanham
Act.7
4
Intellectual property law fails to distribute ownership rights
adequately. First, a trademark approach measures the scope of a
subscriber's right in his phone number by focusing on the rights of
third parties (i.e., potential infringers). Defining a third party's right
does not sufficiently protect the subscriber, since protecting a
subscriber from a junior user's registration of a similar phone number
is practically meaningless when the phone company or government
can appropriate the subscriber's (senior user's) phone number at will.
Second, intellectual property issues will arise only when there are two
parties each fighting over the use of one trademark (one similar
mnemonic). The Red Arms scenario, for example, is an entirely
different situation because there are two distinct telephone
mnemonics but only one underlying number, and such a scenario
would not implicate intellectual property law. Third, trademark
infringement cannot be asserted unless actual consumer confusion is
shown. In fact, there are many instances where courts are reluctant to
find the requisite consumer confusion. 75 This reluctance is even
greater when the disputing parties are in unrelated businesses. 76 In
72. Holiday Inns, Inc. v. 800 Reservation, Inc., 86 F.3d 619, 623 (6th Cir. 1996) (quoting
Carson v. Here's Johnny Portable Toilets, Inc., 698 F.2d 831, 834 (6th Cir. 1983)).
73. Am. Airlines v. 1-800-A-M-E-R-I-C-A-N Corp., 622 F. Supp. 673, 686 (D. Ill. 1985).
74. Id.
75. See Bell v. Kidan, 836 F. Supp. 125, 127 (S.D.N.Y. 1993) (finding that plaintiffs CALL-
LAW and defendant's 1-800-LAW-CALL did not incite consumer confusion because "[n]o
sophistication is required to understand those simple features of telephone dialing').
76. If more than one party holds a legitimate interest in a single trademark, traditionally
intellectual property law will not adequately resolve the dispute. For example, it took nearly four
years to resolve the dispute over delta.com, in which Delta Airlines, Delta Financial, and
DeltaComm Internet Services each competed for the domain name. Christopher Elliot, No
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conclusion, intellectual property law often fails to provide adequate
legal recourse to the holders of entity locator rights.
C. Denial of Protective Rights Produces Incongruous Law
Phone numbers are not property by doctrine but they are by
expectation. Constantly evolving technology, new uses, cheaper costs,
and changed consumer expectations have altered the landscape
sufficiently enough that phone numbers have begun to serve as
tangible forms of property.77 Therefore, applying conventional judicial
doctrines, which fail to recognize a property interest in the underlying
number, no longer makes sense as old laws simply have not adapted to
new technology.
1. Congruency in the Law
The FCC, most courts, and state and federal legislatures have
declined to grant subscribers property rights in their phone numbers.
Implicitly then, a phone number is not substantial enough, or
important enough, to warrant the constitutional protections given to
"property." Accordingly, a difficulty arises: How can there be instances
when the government's stake in such a negligible interest is
substantial enough to necessitate its appropriation?
The law must be reasonably congruent in order to be fair.78 The
principle of congruence requires the same analysis when determining
both the subscriber's and the government's stake in the interest being
appropriated. In other words, if the subscriber's interest is negligible,
does not amount to "property," and does not rise to the level to grant
any sort of protections, then we should find that the government's
"need" for that number is not great enough to permit its taking
without invoking Fifth Amendment protections of "public use" and
"just compensation."
In contrast, some authorities believe that the less important
the property interest is to its owner, the lower the government's
burden to appropriate that interest. 79 But such logic is faulty: the
mere fact that the government wants to appropriate the interest
Winner in Delta.corn Deal, INSIDE INTERACTIVE TRAVEL, Sept. 5, 2000, http://www.elliott.org/
interactive/2000/delta.htm.
77. See infra Part II.C.2.
78. See, e.g., Merrill, supra note 35, at 980 (stating that there should be "a very high level of
congruence between those interests deemed constitutional property and those interests that
people expect to be protected as property").
79 See, e.g., FCC Order, supra note 4.
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indicates that the interest is not negligible.80 Furthermore, the
purpose of the Fifth Amendment is to protect an owner's property
investment when its appropriation is required for the public good.
There is no prevailing calculus for assessing when justice and fairness
require that the state reimburse a private individual for economic
harms caused by public actions as opposed to when the costs should
remain disproportionately levied on the private individual.8' And the
argument for congruency does not attempt to find such an equation.
Instead, congruency principles advise that in determining whether the
government must comply with the Taking Clause's requirements, one
should use a similar formula to assess the value the owner and the
public derive from the intangible interest being taken. It is highly
likely that the intangible property interest will not truly be negligible
to the owner, and therefore, the owner should be accorded her Fifth
Amendment protections.
Finally, the congruency analysis, which may be described as a
balancing of the state's interest against the private interest, is
associated with the issue of "taking" authority, not "just
compensation."8' 2 In other words, in determining congruency the
relevant question is whether the government has the authority to take
the property, not whether the state can deny compensation.8 3 The
issue of compensation involves an analysis of the state's police power
and is outside the scope of this Note.8
4
2. Emerging Property Interests and Traditional Legal Doctrines
The traditional contract-for-services theory of phone numbers
is largely anachronistic in today's world. First, subscribers rarely
receive phone numbers by random allocation anymore, and instead,
commercial subscribers usually request a specific phone number with
a meaningful mnemonic.8 5 Because the numbers are distinct and
significant to the subscriber, treating them as indistinguishable
service contracts appears awkward. Second, modern telephone
80. By inference, if the interest is valuable to the government, it is, more likely than not,
valuable to the owner.
81. See Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978).
82. See Frank I. Michelman, Property, Utility, and Fairness: Comments on the Ethical
Foundations of "Just Compensation"Law, 80 HARV. L. REV. 1165, 1193-95 (1967).
83. See id.
84. Id. at 1166.
85. "[A] recognizable, memorable business number can 'triple or quadruple call volume.'
Dru Sefton, The Price of Vanity Numbers Pays Off; Phone Digits That Spell Words Ring Up
Profits, NEW ORLEANS TIMES-PICAYUNE, Oct. 31, 2004, at 9. Today, potential subscribers request
specific numbers from one of more than 300 responsible organizations known as "resporgs." Id.
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numbers are portable. The FCC allows subscribers to switch telecom
carriers and retain their phone numbers in order to keep the telecom
industry competitive.86 This right to retain arguably amounts to a
personal property interest rather than a mere contractual right to use.
Third, due to advancements in technology, a customer is not restricted
to a local phone number. Voice over Internet Protocol ("VoIP"), allows
a person in Texas, for example, to subscribe to a Boston area code,
allowing friends from Boston to call for local rates. This expanded
freedom of choice has resulted in some numbers becoming more
valuable than others, and therefore, in order to allocate resources
efficiently, property law, not contract law, seems preferential. Fourth,
Electronic Numbering ("ENUM") gives subscribers a single number
that can be used to access any of their communications devices-home
phone, work phone, cell phone, or email.8 7 With ENUM, it is likely
that each person will become associated with one number for life.
8 8 If
so, giving a service provider an unrestricted right to alter the number
might be fundamentally unfair. Finally, the recent enactment of "Do-
not-call" legislation gives subscribers the choice not to be contacted.
8 9
The right not to be disturbed is analogous to a right to exclude and
traditionally attaches to a higher form of property ownership than a
mere right to use.90
3. Natural Law
John Locke's labor theory of property, grounded in natural law,
states that an individual has "a property [right] in [his] own person"
and in "the labor of [his] body."91 Accordingly:
Whatsoever then he removes out of the State that Nature hath provided, and left it in,
he hath mixed his Labour with, and joyned to it something that is his own, and thereby
86. 47 C.F.R. § 52.23 (2007); Provision of Access for 800 Service, Notice of Proposed
Rulemaking, 102 F.C.C. 2d 1387, 3-5, at 1388-89 (Jan. 23, 1986).
87. Gerry Blackwell, A Phone Number for Life, WI-Fi PLANET, July 6, 2005, http://www.wi-
fiplanet.com/voip/article.php/3517896.
88. See id.
89. In re Rules and Regulations Implementing the Telephone Consumer Protection Act of
1991, 18 F.C.C.R. 14,014, 1, at 14,017 (June 26, 2003) (establishing a national do-not-call
registry). In addition, many states have enacted "do-not-call" laws. See, e.g., N.J. STAT. ANN. §
48:17-25 (West 2006); N.Y. GEN. Bus. LAw § 399-z (McKinney 2006); TENN. CODE ANN. § 65-4-
405 (2006).
90. See Merrill, supra note 35, at 976 (describing a license as a "permission slip" that does
not embrace "any right to exclude"). But see Pouy v. Mandia, 254 N.Y.S. 536, 536 (N.Y. App. Div.
1931) (finding that because the beneficial enjoyment of an easement appurtenant to land accrues
not only to the owner of the land but to bona fide tenants and licensees of that owner, a licensee
of the owner may enjoin interference with the easement).
91. Sudakshina Sen, Fluency of the Flesh: Perils of an Expanding Right of Publicity, 59 ALB.
L. REV. 739, 739-40 (1995).
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makes it his Property. It being removed from the common state Nature placed it in, it
hath by this labour something annexed to it, that excludes the common right of other
Men.
9 2
Application of Locke's labor theory to phone numbers urges
that because a subscriber spends time, money, and energy in
publicizing and promoting his phone number, he is entitled to the
fruits of his labor-retaining the phone number for as long as he
desires. Moreover, telephone companies who appropriate subscribers'
publicized phone numbers without permission and "license" them to
other subscribers are analogous to " 'free riders' [who] improperly reap
what others have sown. ' 93 In sum, even if courts do not protect the
value of the phone numbers themselves, it is only fair that they
protect the value of the labor expended promoting the number.
4. Consumer Expectations
The lack of property protection for phone numbers contradicts
subscriber expectations in several ways. First, subscribers expect to
maintain the right to their phone number indefinitely, or at least have
the option to.94 Even though the subscriber might sign a one- or two-
year contract, the marketplace promotes the ability of subscribers to
renew their agreements indefinitely. 95 This expectation of longevity is
critical in encouraging commercial development
96
Second, because courts treat phone numbers as business
assets97 and routinely protect them in bankruptcy proceedings,
98
subscribers inherently expect that they will be able to transfer or
assign those rights, a practice that most service agreements prohibit.99
92. JOHN LOCKE, Two TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT 306 (Peter Laslett ed., Cambridge Univ.
Press 1967) (1698).
93. Sen, supra note 91, at 740 (citation omitted).
94. Warren E. Agin, I'm a Domain Name. What am I? Making Sense of Kremen v. Cohen, 14
J. BANKR. L. & PRAC. 73, 78 (2005) (describing the expectations of domain name registrants).
95. Id.
96. Id.
97. See, e.g., In re Fontainebleau Hotel Corp., 508 F.2d 1056, 1059 (5th Cir. 1975) ("The
telephone numbers are a valuable asset, just like the hotel's building or furniture."); Clayton
Home Equip. Co. v. Fla. Tel. Corp., 152 So. 2d 203, 204 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1963) ("The telephone
number assigned to and accepted by one who contracts for telephone services becomes a valuable
business asset in the hands of the subscriber .....
98. In re Fontainebleau, 508 F.2d at 1059.
99. Seth Lubove, Numbers Game, FORBES, July 25, 2005, at 58 (quoting Mitchell
Knishbacher of 800response as saying, "'We should be able to go to people and say... 'your
number has little value to you'. . . and we'll take the number to people who can use it"' and
quoting Scott Richards of Dial 800 as saying, " 'The FCC has to wake up and realize there's a
significant economic benefit to having an 800 number for a business,' but no easy way of securing
the numbers ... ').
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The fact that telephone numbers generally transfer in corporate
mergers and takeovers 00 adds to this expectation. In addition, domain
names, which are near-analogous entity locators, are freely alienable
(so popular a concept that a cottage industry has emerged around
selling domain names). 10' Finally, as with longevity, phone numbers'
transferability helps drive commercialization in the marketplace.
5. Dynamic Society
Changes in technology often promote changes in property
law.10 2 For example, the common law of property once held that a title
to land carried with it the rights of ownership usque ad coelum,
ownership of the surface land as well as "the airspace above it and all
the ground beneath it-from the center of the earth to the heavens.'
'10 3
As explained by University of Richmond Law School Dean Rod Smolla:
When airplanes came along, however, that old law had to yield, or air travel would have
been impossible. It would not have been tenable to require that pilots secure permission
before flying over the property of others, even though the law had for centuries treated
intrusion on someone's airspace as a trespass.
1 0 4
Similarly, it makes little sense to ruin the expectations of
telephone service subscribers who use their phone numbers differently
today than subscribers did during Alexander Graham Bell's
generation. By analogy to the airplanes, if the law uniformly destroys
the expectations that subscribers have in their phone number, "then
something is wrong with the law," not with the subscribers. 105 In
short, our law must evolve alongside our dynamic and amorphous
society.
100. Cargo Partner AG v. Albatrans Inc., 207 F. Supp. 2d 86, 107 (S.D.N.Y. 2002)
(determining that a corporate "purchaser acquired not just fixed assets, but also all intangible
assets (such as good will, patents, customer lists, phone numbers and the seller's prior name)"
(interpreting Wensing v. Paris Indus.-N.Y., 558 N.Y.S.2d 54 (N.Y. App. Div. 1990))).
101. See, e.g., Interactive Prods. Corp. v. a2z Mobile Office Solutions, Inc., 326 F.3d 687, 691
(6th Cir. 2003) ("Each website has a corresponding domain name, which is an identifier
somewhat analogous to a telephone number or street address.").




105. Id. Justice Jackson stated this idea eloquently: "It is not the function of our Government
to keep the citizen from falling into error; it is the function of the citizen to keep the Government
from falling into error." Am. Commc'ns Ass'n, C.I.O. v. Douds, 339 U.S. 382, 442-43 (1950)
(Jackson, J., dissenting).
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III. ATTEMPTS BY COURTS AND ACADEMICS TO GIVE PROPERTY
PROTECTION TO INTANGIBLE RIGHTS
This Part discusses two theories of property rights distribution
for phone numbers and other intangible interests. The first is an
approach currently used by some courts to allocate ownership rights to
telephone subscribers by balancing rigid contract law with more
tolerant property doctrines. The second approach is an innovative
academic theory, yet to be adopted by the judiciary, which defines an
entirely new class of property for emerging interests.
A. Injecting Common Law of Property to Balance the Contractual
Limitations
In order to meet consumer expectations, some courts have
begun to recognize ownership rights in phone numbers. These courts
have injected property law into their analyses as a way to balance the
traditional contract-for-services approach to allocating rights.
However, there is little consensus between jurisdictions in the
property rights a subscriber has in his number. This Part attempts to
define these differing degrees of ownership.
1. Property Law Doctrines Promote Efficient Use
Property law doctrines are advantageous resources for courts to
use when allocating ownership rights. The principles of property law
seek to ensure that valuable resources are used in their best, most
efficient manner. This efficiency occurs for three primary reasons, as
property law (1) recognizes a limited number of forms, (2) groups
property rights together in a single holder, and (3) resists burdens on
the property's use.
10 6
First, property law is standardized-it is based around the
recognition of a limited number of forms and estates-which creates
certainty and predictability. 10 7 Because property forms such as
easements, leases, and fee simple estates are widely recognized, third
parties have greater notice of the types of interests they can hold, and
transaction costs are decreased. 08 By comparison, the existence of
contractual limitations on property rights requires potential
purchasers to conduct a search of what those limitations are, resulting
106. Joshua A.T. Fairfield, Virtual Property, 85 B.U. L. REV. 1047, 1071-72 (2005).
107. Id. at 1050-51.
108. Id. at 1051.
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in higher transaction costs. 10 9 Second, property law seeks to "unify
marketable title" in one person in order to give him "the full incentives
to maximize the value, minimize the damage, and alienate the
property when someone can put it to better use.'"110 In addition,
aggregating rights into a single property holder lowers both search
and negotiation costs for potential purchasers.1 Third, an inherent
function of property law is to limit contractual burdens on property
use."12 Doctrines central to property law oppose "contracts that lock
property into low-value uses, or that make it too difficult for other
parties to make productive use of the property."" 3 For example, the
policy underlying adverse possession is to maximize a property's use
by defeating dormant claims, even if protected by contract."
4
2. Bifurcation of Rights: Contract for Service Separate from Property
Interest in Phone Number
Some courts have begun to distinguish between the
subscriber's contractual rights to phone service and the subscriber's
possessory interest in his underlying phone number. Most cases that
have bifurcated the phone number from the contract rights have done
so in an improvised attempt to promote fairness, contending that
because a phone number has been advertised and publicized, it is, on
its own, a valuable asset and an independent property right in
addition to the explicit rights derived from the service agreement.
115
Effectively, courts have implemented, ad hoc, property law doctrines
to balance the harshness of contract law and aid in defining ownership
and transferability rules. As a result, courts have afforded subscribers
varying degrees of property rights in their numbers. These ownership
interests in phone numbers differ enormously by jurisdiction." 6 This
subsection attempts to analogize the property rights afforded in these
109. Id. at 1090.
110. Id. at 1071.
111. See id. at 1090.
112. Id. at 1071-72.
113. Id. at 1071.
114. See RALPH E. BOYER ET AL., THE LAW OF PROPERTY: AN INTRODUCTORY SURVEY 49 (4th
ed. 1991).
115. Clayton Home Equip. Co. v. Fla. Tel. Corp., 152 So. 2d 203, 204 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1963) (finding that where a subscriber relies on service agreement and advertised his telephone
number, the number "becomes a valuable business asset in the hands of the subscriber").
116. See, e.g., Slenderella Sys. of Berkeley, Inc. v. Pac. Tel. & Tel. Co., 286 F.2d 488, 490 (2d
Cir. 1961) (finding that a subscriber has ownership rights in a telephone number equivalent to a
real property license); Clayton, 152 So. 2d at 204 (finding that a subscriber has ownership rights
in a telephone number equivalent to a real property easement).
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opinions to a common law property estate in order to clarify the
current state of the law.
a. Interest in Number as a License
Several courts have held that the interest in a phone number
amounts to a mere license. 117 A license is a non-possessory interest in
property that permits the licensee a right to use the number for a
specified time period.118 Because the interest does not even amount to
possession of the property, a license is revocable at the will of the
property owner. 1 9
In Slenderella Systems of Berkeley, Inc. v. Pacific Telephone &
Telegraph Company, the Second Circuit found that the bifurcated
number amounted to "a license to use a specific telephone number"
since a subscriber never holds "physical possession" of his number.
120
The court concluded that "telephone[] numbers were thus not the
property of each [subscriber]."'12  Similarly, in Jahn v. 1-800-
FLOWERS.com, Inc., the Seventh Circuit analogized a subscriber's
interest in a telephone number to a broadcast license. 122 As such,
Judge Easterbrook asserted that "subscribers do not own [the]
telephone numbers assigned to them .... [and] carriers could change
numbers without liability to the subscribers."'
123
This theory, however, has several flaws. Under a pure licensing
theory, government appropriation of a telephone number does not
invoke Fifth Amendment protections of "public use" and "just
compensation." The appropriation of licensing rights does not
necessitate eminent domain power because, technically, the
government has not taken any "private property."'124 Moreover, the
subscriber received the phone number with the knowledge that it was
revocable at any time, at the will of the phone company. Thus, a
117. Slenderella, 286 F.2d at 490 ('The license to use a specific telephone number does not
amount to the possession required as a basis for summary jurisdiction."); see also Amber Auto.,
Inc. v. Ill. Bell Tel. Co., 305 N.E.2d 270, 271 (Ill. App. Ct. 1973).
118. JON W. BRUCE & JAMES W. ELY, JR., THE LAW OF EASEMENTS AND LICENSES IN LAND
§ 11:1 (2001).
119. Id.
120. Decided in the context of a bankruptcy proceeding, the court held that since the
subscriber did not have possession of the number, the number could not be protected by the
court. Slenderella, 286 F.2d at 490-91.
121. Id.
122. Jahn v. 1-800-Flowers.com, Inc., 284 F.3d 807, 811 (7th Cir. 2002) ("If broadcast licenses
may be sold even though they are not 'property' of the licensees, then telephone numbers could
be sold ... even though they, too, are not the subscribers' property.").
123. Id. at 810.
124. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
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license-based approach is still subject to the congruency problem: The
subscriber does not have enough need to acquire a property interest to
invoke "just compensation," but the government deems it important
enough to effectively "take" it.125
In addition, receiving a mere license opposes the Lockean ideal
that one's labor serves as a proxy for property rights, and that law
should protect as property the value of one's labor.126 Under a
licensing theory, even if a subscriber spends money advertising,
promoting, and publicizing her phone number, the phone company or
government can take away that number at will, with no residual
liability to the subscriber.
b. Interest in Number as an Easement by Estoppel (Irrevocable License)
Ordinarily, a license is completely revocable. However, some
jurisdictions may prevent revocation if the licensee expends money or
labor in reliance on a reasonable expectation of continued use.1 27 The
seminal case on licenses gaining irrevocability, Stoner v. Zucker, held
that a landowner could not revoke a license permitting a builder to
enter land and construct a drainage ditch once the builder had
expended money to complete the project.' 28 According to the California
Supreme Court, "where a licensee has ... expended money, or its
equivalent in labor, in the execution of a license, the license becomes
irrevocable" and "the license becomes, in all essentials, an
easement."' 29 The equitable principles at work closely parallel Locke's
labor theory of property: Property rights protect the value of the labor,
if not the value of the tangible or intangible "thing" itself.1 30
In Clayton Home Equipment Co. v. Florida Telephone Corp., 31
a Florida appellate court found that a subscriber obtained irrevocable
rights in the license of his phone number similar to the rights
acquired by licensee in Stoner, though the court never mentioned the
terms "irrevocable" or "easement." Clayton found that although the
right to use a telephone number was an ordinary license, once the
subscriber/licensee made expenditures on it, it could not be
125. Id.
126. See supra Part II.C.3.
127. This equitable doctrine is based on the principle that "it would be inequitable to permit
the licensor to revoke the privilege when the licensee has changed position in reliance on the
permitted use." BRUCE & ELY, supra note 118, § 11:9.
128. Stoner v. Zucker, 83 P. 808, 810 (Cal. 1906).
129. Id.
130. See supra Part II.C.3.
131. Clayton Home Equip. Co. v. Fla. Tel. Corp., 152 So. 2d 203 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1963).
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appropriated without "just cause. '132 Because the plaintiff in Clayton
had relied upon his telephone service agreement and had publicized
his phone number on his business vehicle and letterhead, and had
advertised the phone number on the radio and in the newspaper, the
phone number became "a valuable business asset in the hands of the
subscriber."133 Therefore, when the phone company could not show
just cause, the court refused to permit the phone company to revoke
the subscriber's license.
134
Similarly, in Dousson v. South Central Bell,135 a Louisiana
appellate court found that a potential subscriber, who had relied on
the telephone company's statement that he could obtain a specific
telephone number, was entitled to monetary damages for "promotional
materials already purchased" when the phone company denied him
that phone number. 13 6 Because a license would have been revocable at
will with no accompanying damages, the Dousson Court implicitly
recognized a higher-order interest in the phone number than a mere
license. 13
7
Easements by estoppel have not found widespread judicial
acceptance. Many jurisdictions refuse to recognize the idea that a
license, by definition a revocable right to use property, could ever
become irrevocable.1 38 These courts believe that a licensee who makes
expenditures should be held to know the revocable character of a
license and to act at her own risk.' 39 In addition, public policy favoring
the free use of land leads to judicial skepticism regarding the notion of
an irrevocable license.140
132. Id. at 204.
133. Id.
134. Id.
135. Dousson v. S. Cent. Bell, 429 So. 2d 466 (La. Ct. App. 1983).
136. Id. at 467, 469.
137. But see Apollo Stereo Music Co. v. Kling, 528 P.2d 976, 978 (Colo. Ct. App. 1974) ("Wrhile
a license may be revoked at will, it does not necessarily follow that the original grantor of the
license is absolved of any liability for the revocation. Where, as here, the contract creating the
license contains a definite term and the licensee has provided a valuable consideration for the
contract, if the grantor of the license violates the terms of the contract in connection with the
revocation, a claim for damage may result therefrom."); BRUCE & ELY, supra note 118, § 11:6.
138. See, e.g., Kitchen v. Kitchen, 641 N.W.2d 245, 248-50 (Mich. 2002) (finding that a
license created by an oral promise cannot become irrevocable because permitting such
irrevocability would violate the Statute of Frauds); Gulf Park Water Co. v. First Ocean Springs
Dev. Co., 530 So. 2d 1325, 1335 (Miss. 1988) ('This Court does not recognize 'irrevocable
licenses."'); Ski-View, Inc. v. State, 492 N.Y.S.2d 866, 869 (N.Y. Ct. Cl. 1985) (noting that the
concept of irrevocable licenses "has rarely been acknowledged in this State"); Brown v. Eoff, 530
P.2d 49, 50 (Or. 1975) ("Oregon is one of a minority of jurisdictions which recognize the
possibility of an irrevocable license.").
139. Larson v. Amundson, 414 N.W.2d 413, 418-19 (Minn. Ct. App. 1987).
140. BRUCE & ELY, supra note 118, § 11:9.
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Even in jurisdictions where irrevocable licenses are recognized,
the irrevocable license interests nevertheless fail to meet consumer
expectations in other regards. Irrevocable licenses are not perpetual,
so a consumer would not have the right to retain the same number
indefinitely.141 In addition, irrevocable licenses are non-alienable
personal interests, so unlike other business assets, a subscriber will
not be able to transfer her telephone number.
42
c. Interest in Number as a Lease
A lease, unlike a license, gives the lessee exclusive occupation
of the property "for all purposes not prohibited by its terms" and a
present possessory interest in the land.143 Thus, the central and
distinguishing characteristic between a lease and a license is that a
license does not transfer possession whereas a lease does. 144
In determining whether an agreement is a license or a lease,
courts rarely approach the issue formalistically and enforce the words
exactly as written, but rather prefer to look to the qualitative nature
of the privileges transferred. 145 For example, in Miller v. City of New
York, the state's highest court found that a document which expressly
purported to be a license was actually a lease because it "contain[ed]
many provisions typical of a lease and conferr[ed] rights well beyond
those of a licensee or holder of a mere temporary privilege." 146 Even
though the licensing agreement contained provisions granting the
licensor significant control (over prices, times of operation, and
141. Bob's Ready to Wear, Inc., v. Weaver, 569 S.W.2d 715, 720 (Ky. Ct. App. 1978) ('The
duration of a license may be limited even though the licensor is estopped to revoke the license.").
142. Shearer v. Hodnette, 674 So. 2d 548, 551 (Ala. Civ. App. 1995) ("It is not an interest
which runs with the land, nor can it be assigned, conveyed, or inherited.").
143. 49 N.Y. JUR. 2D Easements § 216 (2006). A license is a right to use property for a
specified purpose, and a licensee has occupation of the property only "so far as necessary to do
the act and no further." Id.
144. See id.
145. See Wood v. Lucy, Lady Duff-Gordon, 118 N.E. 214, 214 (N.Y. 1917) ('The law has
outgrown its primitive stage of formalism when the precise word was the solemn talisman, and
every slip was fatal. It takes a broader view today. A promise may be lacking, and yet the whole
writing may be 'instinct with an obligation,' imperfectly expressed." (quoting Moran v. Standard
Oil Co. of N.Y., 105 N.E. 217, 221 (N.Y. 1914))); see also Bagg v. Robinson, 34 N.Y.S. 37, 40 (N.Y
Sup. Ct. 1895) ("But it seems to be now pretty firmly established that mere words will not
govern, but the court will look at the nature of the right, rather than the name by which it is
called. And while, in the present case, the language used in the lease granting the right to sell, in
a strict sense, are words of license, yet the court is not bound by the technical meaning of the
words, and will look at the end sought to be accomplished by the instrument .... ").
146. Miller v. City of New York, 203 N.E.2d 478, 479-80 (N.Y. 1964) (finding that where
taxpayers sued the city claiming the transfer of property by the Commissioner was a lease rather
than a license as purported in the written agreement: "A document calling itself a 'license' is still
a lease if it grants not merely a revocable right to be exercised over the grantor's land without
possessing any interest therein but the exclusive right to use and occupy that land.").
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employees of the licensed land), the Court of Appeals held that these
"strict and detailed" provisions were "no more than [what] would
reasonably be demanded by a careful owner against a lessee." 147 In
addition, Chief Judge Desmond found that the express and seemingly
broad language148 giving the licensor revocation authority did not, in
fact, amount to a "revocable-at-pleasure clause" required by a
license. 149
Although not using explicit "lease" language, the Fifth Circuit
has held that the right to use a telephone number constitutes a
present possessory interest in that number, which can be analogized
to the possession requirement of a leasehold estate.150 In Foutainbleau
Hotel Corp v. South Central Bell Telephone Co., the court needed to
find possession of a phone number by the subscriber in order for the
bankruptcy court to acquire summary jurisdiction.' 51 Judge Ainsworth
reasoned that since "telephone numbers are a valuable asset," a debtor
must able to protect telephone numbers "just like the hotel's
building[,] or furniture," or any other asset in order to effect the
purpose of the bankruptcy proceeding.152 Rather than finding
ownership of title, the court found that a possessory interest in a
telephone number was sufficient to invoke summary jurisdiction in a
bankruptcy proceeding. 53
The Fifth Circuit again in Georgia Power Company v. Security
Investment implicitly found that phone number rights amounted to a
lease from the phone company by distinguishing the right to use
phone service from the possessory interest in an actual phone
number. 54 The court found that "telephone numbers constitute a
unique property interest, the value of which increases as the number
becomes widely known through publication in guidebooks, posting on
147. Id. at 480.
148. The termination provision read, in relevant part, that the Commissioner may
"terminate the license when, in his sole judgment, he deems that such termination is necessary
by the operation of law, or he deems that the licensed premises are required for a paramount
park or other purpose." Id. Even though the Commissioner retained a right to revoke the
'license,' the court found though seemingly broad, the provision actually 'limit[ed] his power of
termination to a situation where it can reasonably be said that the city needs the land for a more
important or pressing public need. This was not [a] revocable-at-pleasure clause ... " Id.
149. Id.
150. In re Fontainebleau Hotel Corp., 508 F.2d 1056 (5th Cir. 1975); In re Sec. Inv. Props.,
Inc, 559 F.2d 1321 (5th Cir. 1977).
151. In re Fontainebleau, 508 F.2d at 1056.
152. Id. at 1059 ("The purpose of summary jurisdiction is to give the bankruptcy court a
quick means of preserving the wherewithal for maintaining the debtor's business.").
153. Id. at 1058 ("For the bankruptcy court to have summary jurisdiction, the debtor or his
trustee must have possession, constructive or actual, of the property in question.").
154. In re Sec. Inv. Props., 559 F.2d 1321.
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billboards, and imprinting on publicity items." 155 More importantly,
the circuit court declared that "[t]he property interest in such
numbers differs from subscriber's rights to the telephone utility's
service,"156 because the phone number is "bound[ed]" and could be
"possessed" in a way that an unbounded right to service could not
be.157 Therefore, a phone number was a definite and bounded right
that was capable of possession, while a right to service was too
nebulous to be actually possessed.
158
Because adjudication of leases primarily involves
interpretation of terms within a lease agreement, analogizing the
property rights in phone numbers to a lease with the phone company
will retain many of the disadvantages of the traditional contract-for-
services doctrine discussed in Part II.B.2. In addition, a lease
approach will introduce problematic landlord-tenant common law
rules. One such rule includes tenancy at sufferance, under which a
landlord may require that a holdover tenant (who has retained
possession of the property after the lease has expired) continue to pay
rent for another full year.159 Another circumstance unique to
leaseholds is that a subscriber's transferability rights would be limited
to assignment or sublease, for each of which the subscriber would
ultimately remain liable for rent/service charges.160
However, one added benefit of a lease analysis over
conventional contract-for-services rights is that not only breach of the
contract but also breach of conveyance 161  will permit the
subscriber/tenant to stop paying services fees/rent. 62 Therefore, any
time the subscriber loses possession of his phone number-that is, if
the phone company were to change his phone number-he can cancel
service without liability (whereas he would remain liable for services
under the common law of contracts).
155. Id. at 1324.
156. Id.
157. "[A] utility company's tariffs do not establish conclusively the bounds of a debtor's
property interest." Id. at 1325.
158. Id.
159. Some state statutes limit residential holdover tenancies to month-to-month. It is
unclear whether a phone number leasehold would adopt the shorter residential statutory
scheme. See, e.g., NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 188A.470 (2005); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 46:8-10 (West
2003); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 704.25 (West 2005).
160. If the tenant subleases the property, the tenant remains liable to the landlord for rent
as if the property was not subleased. If the property is assigned, the tenant remains ultimately
liable for rent as a surety, but the assignee is liable in the first order, under privity of estate.
161. A breach of conveyance is a loss of possession, an actual eviction from the property.
162. See Christopher Vaeth, Annotation, Landlord's Duty, on Tenant's Failure to Occupy, or
Abandonment of, Premises, to Mitigate Damages by Accepting or Procuring Another Tenant, 75
A.L.R. 5TH 1 (2006).
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d. Interest in Number as Intangible Fee Simple Ownership
A final application of property law to ownership rights in a
telephone number would result in a subscriber's full ownership, a fee
simple interest. 163 A fee simple absolute is the largest ownership
interest one can have at common law; it is "the greatest possible
aggregate of rights, privileges, powers and immunities" in property,
and "[i]t is of potentially infinite duration."
164
No court yet has determined that a subscriber has fee simple
ownership in her phone number. However, in Kremen v. Cohen, the
Ninth Circuit held that the individual registrant owns the domain
name, not the internet service provider, creating an interest analogous
to a fee simple.165 The court used a three-part test to determine
whether the domain name amounted to a property interest: "First,
there must be an interest capable of precise definition; second, it must
be capable of exclusive possession or control; and third, the putative
owner must have a legitimate claim to exclusivity." 166 Judge Kozinski
found that "a domain name is a well-defined interest" because the
registrant of the domain name owns a specific set of rights that decide
exactly where those who type the name into their browser will end
up.1 67 Next, the circuit court determined that the registrant has
exclusive ownership since once registered, no one but "the registrant
alone" has the rights to the domain name.1 68 Finally, a registrant has
a legitimate claim to his rights because "[r]egistering a domain name
is like staking a claim to a plot of land at the title office."'169
Registration informs others that the domain name belongs to the
registrant and that they cannot now register it. The court concluded
that because a registrant's interest in a domain name satisfied all of
the elements, a registrant has "an intangible right in his domain
name."170
Although the opinion provides "no guidance regarding the
nature of the property right,"1 7' it is justifiable to find fee simple
ownership, rather than a mere possessory interest as in Fountainbleu.
163. A life estate, an interest in the phone number that lasts for the lifetime of the holder,
seems illogical, and will not be discussed.
164. BOYER ET AL., supra note 114, at 82.










When determining whether the second element of the property test
was satisfied, the court needed to find only whether "it was capable of
exclusive possession or control." 172 However, Judge Kozinski found
that "[o]wnership is exclusive in that the registrant alone makes that
decision." 173 In addition the court found that "domain names are
valued, bought and sold, often for millions of dollars."174 Because the
profits from sales would go to the registrant and not the internet
service provider, it is a fair assessment that the Kremen court felt that
registrants held ownership of their domain names, rather than some
lesser right to possession.
A fundamental shortcoming of applying the fee simple interests
to phone numbers is that it is antithetic to the FCC's stance on
ownership of phone numbers. The FCC fears that allowing individual
ownership will result in a property-like grab for vanity numbers, and
fee simple rights would give subscribers such an opportunity.
175
Second, the fee simple approach is potentially unnecessary. There is
no evidence that subscribers crave fee simple absolute rights in their
phone numbers, and many subscribers may simply be happier paying
less and receiving fewer rights in return. Third, critics may argue that
there is no judicial support for a fee simple interest even in a domain
name, 176 and that this Note's contention that Kremen recognized a fee
simple estate is an unwarranted and incorrect interpretation.
177
3. Criticism of Contract and Property Common Law Balancing
Approach: Lack of Uniformity
When courts have bifurcated phone numbers from the service
rights in contractual service agreement, they have done so in an ad
hoc manner to promote fairness, granting subscribers rights to their
phone number in exchange for their reliance expenditures. As a result
of improvised decisionmaking, property rights afforded to subscribers
vary widely by jurisdiction, which has led to strikingly disparate law.
Not only do courts grant dissimilar degrees of property interests,
which vary from licenses and easements to intangible leases and fee
simples, but courts have also, at times, treated identical property
172. Kremen, 337 F.3d at 1030.
173. Id. (emphasis added).
174. Id.
175. See Manheim & Solum, supra note 54, at 385.
176. After all, no other federal circuit has explicitly held that a registrant owns his domain
name. Although most courts have not decided the issue, at least one court follows the phone
number contract-for-service theory, concluding that registrants do not have individual ownership
in their domain names. Network Solutions, Inc. v. Umbro Int'l, Inc., 529 S.E.2d 80, 87 (Va. 2000).
177. This argument would proceed by finding that Kremen found possession, which is the
minimum interest required to support the tort of conversion.
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rights inconsistently. For example, though both the Second Circuit in
Slenderella and Seventh Circuit in Jahn found that a phone number
amounted to a license, each court treated the licenses differently. The
Fifth Circuit held that a license to use a phone number was a
transferable interest in Jahn, while the Second Circuit found that the
subscriber's license in Slenderella amounted to non-alienable right.178
In sum, although the introduction of property law may balance
contractual limitations, lower transaction costs, and allocate resources
more efficiently, without a single, exclusive standard for phone
numbers, the result will continue to be what it has been: erratic and
unpredictable law. 179
B. Recognizing a New Class of Virtual Property
Some scholars have urged for the legal recognition of a new
class of "virtual property,"180 consisting of contemporary and emerging
property interests. The idea is that by treating these rights as a group
instead of individually, we can consider common problems and
expectations in order to create generalized and uniform governing law.
No case law uses the term "virtual property"; as of now, it is an
entirely academic theory.'81 The literature available on virtual
property is thin, and no prior analysis of the intersection of virtual
property and the Takings Clause currently exists. This Part,
therefore, will first explain the concept of virtual property and then
will attempt to apply a theory of Takings property to the virtual
property world.
1. Overview of Virtual Property
The virtual property approach entails grouping together the
intangible interests of virtual worlds-chat rooms, web sites, phone
numbers, screen names, email addresses, etc.-and developing a body
of property law to allocate these intangible rights. Acknowledging
these interests involves giving the "property" designation to a species
of right that "legal academics have consistently rejected .... as having
178. Jahn v. 1-800-Flowers.com, Inc., 284 F.3d 807, 811 (7th Cir. 2002); Slenderella Sys. of
Berkeley, Inc. v. Pac. Tel. & Tel. Co, 286 F.2d 488, 490-91 (2d Cir. 1961).
179. Due to the desire for uniformity, it may be more practical for the issue to be addressed
by statute.
180. See, e.g., David Nelmark, Virtual Property: The Challenges of Regulating Intangible,
Exclusionary Property Interests Such as Domain Names, 3 Nw. J. TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 1
(2004); Fairfield, supra note 106, at 1078.
181. Fairfield, supra note 106, at 1084.
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no useful content."'18 2 The benefits are twofold. First, extending
property law to virtual property will ensure the efficient use of these
emerging resources.18 3 Second, instead of ad hoc judicial decisions
directed at one type of intangible property interest, there is an
increased opportunity to develop uniform and consistent precedent,
applicable to many types of emerging interests.
18 4
To constitute virtual property, the interest or expectancy must
be intangible, exclusionary,1 8 5 and obtained through registration.
1 8 6 Of
primary significance, virtual property is distinct from, and should not
be confused with, intellectual property. Whereas intellectual property
rights include the ownership of the embodiment in every occurrence,
virtual property rights include ownership of the particular article in
one instance.187 For example, intellectual property rights of a book
include ownership of the copyrighted text, in every format in which it
is published.188 Owning one copy of the e-book would be analogous to
the virtual property rights.18 9 In a vanity phone number, like 1-800-
FLOWERS, virtual property rights would be property rights of the
underlying number, 1-800-356-9377. Intellectual property rights
would be ownership of the 1-800-FLOWERS® trademark.
Generally, virtual property is easy to obtain.190 The registration
process may require filing an application and paying associated fees,
which stands in stark contrast to registering intellectual property. In
comparison, patent registration first requires developing an original
idea that then must survive an exhaustive examination process.' 91
Nonetheless, virtual property is still very valuable. In 2004, the
telephone number 1-800-GREAT-RATE was sold on eBay for more
than $100,000.192 Despite being easier to acquire than intellectual
property, virtual property is arguably more costly to maintain, since
phone numbers and domain names realize their value only once they
182. Id. at 1102.
183. Id. at 1050.
184. Nelmark, supra note 180, at 72-74.
185. Id. at 4 ("The first characteristic distinguishes this class of property from traditional (or
real) property, while the second distinguishes it from intellectual property."). In other words,
unlike a patent, only one person at a time can use and possess virtual property.
186. See id. at 9.
187. Fairfield, supra note 106, at 1096.
188. Id.
189. The electronic file of the book would be virtual property. See id.
190. Nelmark, supra note 180, at 9.
191. Id.
192. Sefton, supra note 85.
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are made known to the public. 193 In fact, it is commonly the promotion
costs spent on virtual property that make it economically valuable.1
94
Finally, it is worth noting that not all virtual property relates
to emerging technology. Early examples of virtual property include
social security numbers and actors' stage names, 195 each of which
involves registered, intangible ownership rights belonging to only one
individual.
196
2. Takings Clause Applied to Virtual Property
Everything that is recognized as virtual property will not meet
the threshold property requirement of the Takings Clause, which
protects only "private property."197 This subsection attempts to find a
methodology that distinguishes protectable virtual property from
other interests or expectancies that do not warrant constitutional
protection. 198 Recognizing that the Constitution itself does not create
property,1 99 Professor Thomas W. Merrill has posited a method to
ascertain cognizable property under the Takings Clause that balances
the framer's underlying concerns to protect individuals from the
threats of excess and oppression 200 with three pragmatic limiting
principles emanated from Supreme Court precedent. 20 1 To determine
which rights fall within the constitutional property definition of the
Takings Clause, Professor Merrill asks whether the rights holder has
"an irrevocable right ... to exclude others from specific assets."20 2
Stated differently, a holder's interest will receive protection from the
Takings Clause so long as the rights (1) contain the right to exclude,
(2) consist of discrete assets, and (3) are otherwise irrevocable. 20 3 This
193. See Nelmark, supra note 180, at 3-4.
194. Id. at 10.
195. No two members of the Screen Actors Guild can use the same professional name, or one
that "resembles so closely as to tend to be confused with the name of any other member." This
rule brought the triple-named actress to prominence, as actors like Sarah Jessica Parker,
Jennifer Love Hewitt, and Melissa Joan Hart began to use their middle names to comply with
the SAG rules. SCREEN ACTORS GUILD MEMBERSHIP RULES AND REGULATIONS, R. 15, available at
http://www.sag.org/ContentlPublic/sag-rules.pdf (last visited Jan. 17, 2007).
196. Nelmark, supra note 180, at 5-6.
197. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
198. See supra Part I1.C (discussing contexts that merit constitutional protection, interests
that have been relied upon, and interests that inherently carry a high expectation of ownership
rights).
199. See supra Part II.A.1.
200. See supra Part III.B.2.
201. Merrill, supra note 35, at 969-81.
202. Id. at 969.
203. Id. at 969-79.
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subsection will apply Professor Merrill's test and assume that virtual
property interests will be identified as constitutionally protected
property when these three criteria are satisfied.
20 4
a. The Right to Exclude
The initial element required for an interest to be
constitutionally cognizable property is that it must be exclusionary.
20 5
The holder must maintain a right to exclude, which includes the right
to sole possession and control, and the right to determine how the
property will be used.20 6 In College Savings Bank v. Florida Prepaid
Postsecondary Expense Board, the Supreme Court held that "[t]he
hallmark of a protected property interest is the right to exclude
others."207 Writing for a 5-4 majority, Justice Scalia held that an
unadjudicated cause of action for false advertising was not "property"
because false advertising protections do not grant any exclusionary
rights.208 In addition to College Savings, other Takings cases have
declared that the right of exclusion is " 'one of the most essential'
rights of property, 'one of the most treasured' rights, or something
'universally held to be a fundamental element of the property right.' "209
Virtual property, by its very definition as an exclusionary right,
satisfies the "right to exclude" criteria. For example, a domain name is
an exclusionary interest because registration of a domain name
prevents anyone else from registering and using the same name. 210 On
the other hand, licensing a parcel of virtual property would amount
only to a right to use, not a right to exclude, and would not be property
under the Takings Clause.211 Even though a license may satisfy the
discreteness requirement (discussed in the next subsection), the fact
that it is not exclusive makes it too insubstantial to warrant Takings
protection.
204. Applying Professor Merrill's Taking's Property test to the virtual property world
envisioned by Professor Fairfield is the crux of what I call "the virtual property approach." As I
mentioned in the introduction, this approach is purely theoretical and an amalgamation of
concepts introduced by law professors.
205. Merrill, supra note 35, at 970-74.
206. See id.
207. Coll. Sav. Bank v. Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd., 527 U.S. 666, 673
(1999).
208. Id.
209. Merrill, supra note 35, at 973.
210. Kremen v. Cohen, 337 F.3d 1024, 1030 (9th Cir. 2003).




The second criterion for a constitutional property interest to
arise to requires that the interest be discrete in the sense that it can
be isolated from the melting pot of other intangible rights and have a
line of protection drawn around it.212 In other words, the claimant
must hold a "specific property interest" as opposed to a mere "incident
of property."21 3 The discreteness element serves to limit the property
protected by the Takings Clause, and confines the clause "to
redressing singling-out rather than larger claims of distributive
justice."21
4
It is not readily apparent whether a category of virtual
property will qualify as a discrete asset. A discrete asset can generally
be analogized to one of the familiar real property estates and be
traded in the marketplace. 21 5 Thus, an easement, lease, and fee simple
qualify as discrete assets.
21 6
An expectation or privilege is a mere "incident of property" and
is beyond the definition of constitutional property. Furthermore, a
"right to use" is only a privilege at common law, rather than a definite
or discrete asset. In Georgia Power, for example, the Fifth Circuit
found that the right to continued phone service is neither well-defined
nor bounded as compared to a finite and discrete interest in a
telephone number. 21 7 Thus, a subscriber's interest in receiving a
service will not amount to property protected by the Takings
Clause. 218 In short, each type of virtual property will likely have to be
analyzed on a case-by-case basis.
c. Irrevocable Right
Third, Takings property is limited to rights holders who have
some degree of expectation that they will retain their property.
212. Id. at 974.
213. Id. at 907.
214. Id. at 998.
215. Id. at 974.
216. In Dolan v. City of Tigard, for example, the Supreme Court found that the land the city
required the plaintiff to dedicate in return for a building permit was essentially a "public
easement" and thus a discrete asset deserving of Takings Clause protection. Dolan v. City of
Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 396 (1994).
217. "A utility company's tariffs do not establish conclusively the bounds of a debtor's
property interest." In re Sec. Inv. Props., Inc., 559 F.2d 1321, 1325 (5th Cir. 1977); see supra note
157 and accompanying text.
218. The Georgia Power court failed to reach the question of whether a phone number
amounted to "private property" under the Takings Clause, as the issue in the case dealt with
electric, not phone, services. In re Sec. Inv. Props., 559 F.2d at 1325.
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According to Professor Merrill, "[T]akings property must be
irrevocable for a predetermined period of time, and there must be no
understanding, explicit or implicit, that the legislature has reserved
the right to terminate the interest before this period of time
elapses. '219 In order to satisfy the requirement, the right does not need
to amount to a full ownership, but it cannot be the subject of
"discretionary revocation."
220
Most types of virtual property will need to be analyzed
individually to determine whether they amount to a revocable right.
For example, a license, which at common law is revocable at the will of
licensor, is not property under the Takings Clause and does not
"support a constitutional claim for compensation." 221
3. Criticisms of the Virtual Property Approach and Motivations for an
Alternative Solution
The initial approach analyzed in Part III.A,, which balances
contractual rights with property law doctrines (the "Balancing
Approach"), has led to alarmingly disparate ownership rights in phone
numbers. Courts continue to struggle to interpret intangible rights
originating from service agreements when common law requires that
"the nature of the right, rather than the name by which it is called"
controls. 222 Furthermore, when a "court is not bound by the technical
meaning of the words," few constraints exist, which predictably leads
to inconsistent results.
223
The second approach, discussed in Part III.B.2 (the "Virtual
Property Approach"), an application of Takings Clause limitations to a
new class of virtual property, has many advantages over Balancing
Approach's strict application of property law. Rather than an arduous
and imprecise analysis of which property form the intangible right is
analogous to in order to determine the property rights accorded,
Professor Merrill's test is a straightforward, formalistic approach that
will likely prove easier to administer. Whereas the Balancing
Approach required distinguishing between licenses, easements, leases
and fee simples on a qualitative level, 224 the Takings property test in
219. Merrill, supra note 35, at 978.
220. Id. at 979.
221. In Dames & Moore v. Regan, for instance, the Supreme Court found that the licenses,
which permitted the attachment of Iranian assets to American legal claims, were revocable.
Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654, 674 (1981).
222. See Bagg v. Robinson, 34 N.Y.S. 37, 40 (N.Y Sup. Ct. 1895) ("[T]he court will look at the
nature of the right rather than the name by which it is called.").
223. Id.
224. See supra Part III.A.2.
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the Virtual Property Approach has three bright-line requirements.
Furthermore, the Virtual Property approach maintains the benefits of
property law realized in the Balancing Approach, since virtual
property that satisfies the three-element test will be protected under
property law doctrines like any other cognizable class of property. By
allocating traditional property protections to virtual property, the
holders will seek the best, most efficient use of the scarce resources.
225
Finally, the virtual property approach is capable of evolving with new
technology. Because the Virtual Property Approach protects the
underlying principles of property (exclusivity, discreteness, and
expectation) rather than specific property forms (as does the
Balancing Approach), new and emerging interests will receive
constitutional protection, so long as they satisfy the three
requirements of cognizable property.
226
Nevertheless, the Virtual Property Approach has lingering
drawbacks. First, virtual property is an amalgamation of different and
distinguishable property forms, and it remains unclear whether one
universal theory can successfully apply to every constituent interest.
For example, domain names and telephone numbers will implicate
different issues due to their distinctive characteristics (every domain
name has its own, distinct IP address whereas two different vanity
names could correspond to the same underlying number).227 Second,
opponents of the Virtual Property Approach may argue that defining a
new class of property is a role for the legislature, not the judiciary.
228
A common law doctrine creating property rights may appear
unauthorized, and instead, we should expect those who want
protection to lobby their representatives for laws they desire. Third,
virtual property is subject to the criticism that the recognition of
constitutional protection for a new class of interests, contributes to the
" 'thingification' of property."229 This critique insists that the argument
to recognize new property rights is entirely circular: We call it
property so that a court will protect it. But, it is the fact that a court is
225. See supra note 106 and accompanying text.
226. See Nelmark, supra note 180, at 22 (stating that lawmakers should avoid "hasty
development of sui generis laws which better fit the new property, but which often address a
very specific act ... without considering the broader implications of the law" such that "when a
fair system of regulation finally develops, the technology involved is likely already outdated").
227. See Ira S. Nathenson, Comment, Showdown at the Domain Name Corral: Property
Rights and Personal Jurisdiction over Squatters, Poachers and Other Parasites, 58 U. PITT. L.
REV. 911, 919 n.29 (1997) ("Before the Internet became commercially popular, domains on it were
most commonly identified by numeric IP addresses.").
228. Fairfield, supra note 106, at 1091.
229. Id. at 1093 (quoting Felix S. Cohen, Transcendental Nonsense and the Functional
Approach, 35 COLUM. L. REV. 809, 820 (1935)).
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protecting it that gives it value and makes it property.230 A final
criticism of the Virtual Property Approach is that Professor Merrill's
test fails to provide an adequate number of constraints, such that
when applied unaltered to virtual property, it may include too many
intangible interests. Certain emerging interests like message board
postings or registered screen names, as well as interests that have yet
to evolve, might conform to Merrill's three requirements when, in fact,
they do not merit Takings Clause protection.
231
IV. PROPOSED SOLUTION: DOCTRINAL AND PRAGMATIC LIMITS WITH
BARRIERS TO ENTRY
A Takings Clause approach is needed that gives due attention
to ownership rights in emerging interests. A new test for Takings
property should contemplate consumer expectations in emerging
property forms, principles of congruency, general fairness and
Lockean's labor theory of property, the Constitutional protections
granted from the state, and the FCC's administrative rationales. This
Part proposes a solution that has taken each of the preceding factors
into consideration.
A. Three-Factor Test and Increased Barriers to Entry
The three-step Kremen test for finding a property interest in a
domain name and Professor Merrill's three characteristics defining
Takings property are remarkably similar. Both tests are premised
around three corresponding factors: (1) the interest's exclusivity, 232 (2)
the interest's discreteness and definability, 233 and (3) the expectation
the interest creates in its holder. 234 The following proposed solution
aggregates the two approaches in a way that combines Kremen's
230. Fairfield, supra note 106, at 1094.
231. See supra note 17 and accompanying text.
232. Judge Kozinski articulates this element when he states that the interest " 'must be
capable of exclusive possession or control.' " Kremen v. Cohen, 337 F.3d 1024, 1030 (9th Cir.
2003) (quoting G.S. Rasmussen & Assocs., Inc. v. Kalitta Flying Serv., Inc., 958 F.2d 896, 903
(9th Cir. 1992)). Professor Merrill states this feature as "the right to exclude others." Merrill,
supra note 35, at 911.
233. The Ninth Circuit requires that the interest is 'capable of precise definition."' Kremen,
337 F.3d at 1030 (quoting G.S. Rasmussen, 958 F.2d at 903). Professor Merrill asserts there
must be a " 'specific property interest' [that] should be understood to mean [a] 'discrete asset.'"
Merrill, supra note 35, at 974.
234. Judge Kozinski describes this component by stating that " 'the putative owner must
have established a legitimate claim of exclusivity,' " and distinguishes a "claim" of exclusivity
from being "capable" of exclusivity (as in the test's first element). Kremen, 337 F.3d at 1030
(quoting G.S. Rasmussen, 958 F.2d at 903). Professor Merrill insists the owner should hold "a
certain degree of security of expectation." Merrill, supra note 35, at 978.
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awareness of consumer expectations in intangible property 23 5 with
Professor Merrill's constraints on the term "private property,"236 while
adhering to the protective ambition of the Takings Clause and Locke's
ideals of fairness. 237 Furthermore, this proposed solution incorporates
additional limiting principles in order to accord with the FCC's
concerns about propertizing intangible interests.
1. Assessing Which Emerging Interests Receive Constitutional
Protection
This subsection will outline a method to assess when an
intangible interest or expectancy warrants Takings Clause protection.
Bringing together the components of the Kremen test and Professor
Merrill's test reveals that intangible interests might receive Fifth
Amendment protection when: (1) the bundle of rights is valuable and
capable of being defined, separated, and protected; (2) the bundle is
substantial enough to warrant protection, indicated by the fact that
rights holder has exclusive possession or control; and (3) the claimant
holds a degree of expectation that her rights will be protected due her
reliance on the persistent nature of the rights. In brief, this subsection
proposes that in order to receive protection under the Takings Clause,
an intangible interest must (1) be a well-defined asset, that (2)
contains exclusionary rights, and (3) carries an expectation of
protection based on the enduring nature of the interest.
a. Well-Defined Asset
The first step consists of two requirements: the emerging
interest must be both well-defined and an asset. The "well-defined"
constraint limits property protection to those interests that are both
recognizable and capable of being separated from the larger mix of
intangible rights. The "asset" restriction requires both that the right
have some value to the holder and that losing the right would amount
to a loss. A right to use service would not meet the "well-defined"
element, while a distinct phone number would. A randomly assigned
phone number that had not been become known to the subscriber
would not meet the valuable asset criteria, but a number that the
subscriber has advertised is an asset with value.
There are several reasons why the "well-defined asset"
requirement makes sense. Foremost, it serves to limit the number of
235. See supra Part III.A.2.d.
236. See supra Part III.B.2.
237. See supra Part II.A.
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interests included. Intangible interests are abundant, not to mention
easily and quickly created.238 Strict limits on what qualifies as
cognizable property is necessary in part to allow for meaningful
regulations under the Fifth Amendment (without bankrupting the
government), as well as to prevent a manifestation of the FCC's fear of
a property grab of intangible rights.239 In the absence of strict limits,
subscribers might acquire phone numbers and domain names that are
significant to the public interest, in hopes of receiving a larger "just
compensation" sum than the cost of registration. Imposing strict limits
on cognizable property would aid in deterring such an opportunity for
arbitrage.
Second, the "asset" requirement targets and achieves the
underlying objective of the property and contract law balancing test
described in Part III.A, i.e., to protect consumer losses for
expenditures already made, either in labor or monetarily. Moreover, a
loss of value requirement serves as another means of limiting and
distinguishing which intangible interests will receive the
constitutional protection that the "property" designation provides.
b. Capable of Exclusion
Furthermore, the emerging interest must be "capable of
exclusive possession or control" in order to constitute cognizable
property.240 Stated differently, the holder alone must be capable of
determining how the rights will be used. This requirement is
undoubtedly justifiable, because exclusivity is the "hallmark" of
constitutional property.241 Moreover, both the Ninth Circuit in Kremen
and Professor Merrill recognized the right to exclude as a mandatory,
if not quintessential, feature of personal property. 242 Particularly in
the intangible rights realm, the right to exclude serves as a functional
limit on the interests that will be recognized as property. Many
intangible interests will not merit constitutional protection entirely
because they are not'exclusive. However, in the intangible world, it
may be harder to classify some interests as exclusive. For example, a
chat room is exclusive in one sense because the creator can invite
238. See supra note 190 and accompanying text.
239. See supra notes 16, 54 and accompanying text.
240. Kremen v. Cohen, 337 F.3d 1024, 1030 (9th Cir. 2003) (quoting G.S. Rasmussen &
Assocs., Inc. v. Kalitta Flying Serv., Inc., 958 F.2d 896, 903 (9th Cir. 1992)).
241. Coll. Sav. Bank v. Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd., 527 U.S. 666, 673
(1999) ('The hallmark of a protected property interest is the right to exclude others. That is 'one
of the most essential sticks in the bundle of rights that are commonly characterized as
property.'" (quoting Kaiser Aetna v. U.S., 444 U.S. 164, 176 (1979))).
242. See Kremen, 337 F.3d at 1030; Merrill, supra note 35, at 911-12.
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certain users and exclude others, but in another sense the area is a
shared right, since the system administrator has the authority to
monitor and access the room at all times.
c. Claim of Expectancy Based on Reliance and Endurance
The third limitation for an intangible right to acquire
constitutional protection requires that the rights holder harbor some
degree of expectation that she will retain the property. An expectation
of protection will come from the fact that the interest is both
persistent in nature and capable of being relied upon. Persistence
means the interest is enduring; that it can be used over and over
rather than just once. 243 For example, "[wlhen an email account owner
turns her laptop off, the information in that account does not cease to
exist" but rather "[ilt persists on the server of her Internet Service
Provider. ' 244 An interest that wanes, such as a message board posting
(which can be deleted at the will of the message board administrator)
will not contain sufficient expectancy of protection. 245
In addition, in order to have a legitimate claim to the property,
the interest must be capable of being relied on. For example, a domain
name or telephone number, which may be advertised and publicized,
carries the necessary expectation of protection. A message board
posting, which is submitted only after agreeing to the house rules and
is subject to deletion by the site administrator, is not capable of being
relied upon and would not involve a legitimate claim of expectation
deserving of constitutional property protection.
Like the first two elements of this solution, the expectancy
element also serves to constrain the scope of property protection given
to intangible rights. Superficially, the element is analogous to the
claim of expectation required by Judge Kozinski in Kremen and
Professor Merrill in his Takings analysis. Comprehensively, however,
the expectancy component that this Note advances is more robust and
thorough, and is designed specifically to extricate intangible interests
unworthy of property status. This approach calls for a conscientious
examination of the interest to ensure that it mimics real, tangible
property of the type the Framers sought to protect. Persistence, which
can typically be ignored in the tangible property realm, is of greater
concern in a virtual world where transitory interests are much more
prevalent. Thus, the solution offered combines a persistence
component to the expectancy and reliance requirement.
243. Fairfield, supra note 106, at 1054.
244. Id.
245. Possibly, the message could receive protection from intellectual property law.
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2. Policy Change: Barriers to Entry to Prevent Property Grab
Since this proposed solution has never been implemented, it
remains unclear whether the solution's three constraints will
adequately restrain consumers from actualizing the FCC's fear of a
property rush for phone numbers. However, withholding property
rights in intangible interests such as phone numbers, as the FCC
rules currently provide, is not an appropriate remedy. 246 One intrinsic
problem is the FCC's distribution system. Currently, emerging
property interests like domain names and phone numbers are easily
obtainable and require only an application and a small fee. 247 One
fundamental answer to the FCC's fear of a property rush for
registering phone numbers and other "entity locator" interests is,
therefore, to increase the barriers to entry, essentially by creating
deterrents. Generally, this could be accomplished on two fronts, (1) by
making the interests either more costly or more difficult to obtain, and
(2) doing away with the first-come, first-served assignment system.248
Although outside the scope of this Note, possible solutions include
auctioning off "entity locator" rights or allocating the rights by lottery
(where the revenue from auction fees or ticket sales could fund the
administrative costs). 249 The refusal of property protection, however, is
an unfair and unjust "solution," that denies subscribers their
constitutional right to "private property."
B. Solution Rectifies the Shortcomings of the Current Approaches
As Part III of this Note explained, the primary flaw in the
current law regarding intangible rights is the failure to balance fears
of granting too much property recognition with consumer expectations
of ownership-type protection while maintaining uniformity in the law.
The proposed solution seeks to ameliorate this deficiency by providing
subscribers with constitutional protection of their emerging,
intangible interests without giving incentives to land-grab for
intangible property. This subsection explains how each part of this
test avoids the problems inherent in the current approaches.
To begin, the solution advanced here formally recognizes that
some forms of intangible interests need constitutional protection.
Identifying these expectancies as Takings Clause property solves the
congruency dispute explained in Part II.C.1, since the "property" that
246. See supra Part I.B. 1.
247. See supra note 190.
248. See Nelmark, supra note 180, at 14 ("ICANN could.., award the domain to the entity




can be taken by the government and the "property" that receives the
government's protections are identical. Second, by granting
subscribers' "property" protection of phone numbers and similar
intangible interests, this approach will be more likely to meet
consumers' expectations. 250 The expectancy aspect of this test is
consistent with the Lockean property theory that one's labor is
valuable and deserves protection.251 In addition, by recognizing
property rights, parties will become less dependent on their service
agreements, which will lead to lower transaction costs that otherwise
amount to pure waste. 252 Third, because this solution deals with
generalized concepts that could belong to many different types of
intangible property rights, the solution has the ability to adapt along
side of evolving technologies. 253 Finally, the test recommends a policy
change that would increase the barriers to entry into the market for
phone numbers, domain names, and other property interests subject
to a property grab, and do away with first-come, first-served
assignment schemes. If it is more costly or difficult to obtain these
rights, squatters will have less impetus to hoard them.
254
Furthermore, taking away the first-come, first-served system will
eliminate the race-to-register incentive for new phone numbers and
domain names. 2
55
C. Sample Analysis: Red Arms
How does this analysis fare in a real world example? The
solution proposed here can be applied to the Red Arms scenario in
order to predict the government's authority to transfer a private
party's phone number. In a suit between Red Arms and the FCC, a
court would begin by determining whether the phone number, 1-800-
RED-ARMS, is a well-defined asset. A phone number is nothing more
than a bundle of rights a subscriber receives along with her phone
service, the real value deriving from the fact that the rights provide
250. See supra Part II.C.4 (discussing the law's complications with customer expectations).
251. See supra Part II.C.3 (discussing Locke's labor theory of property).
252. Fairfield, supra note 106, at 1090 ('Transaction costs (or, if the deal does not go
through, deadweight loss) are pure social waste.").
253. See supra Part II.C.2 (discussing emerging property interests that no longer fit neatly
into the conventional law).
254. See supra note 52 and accompanying text (discussing the FCC's fear of subscribers
hoarding and brokering telephone numbers).
255. Second Report and Order, supra note 52, 22.
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information on how to locate the subscriber. 256 Similar to the domain
name in Kremen, a phone number is a definite interest that performs
a specific function (i.e., directs callers to certain places). In addition,
unlike phone service, which is indefinite, amorphous, and without
clear borders, a phone number is "bound[ed]" 257 and contains definite
confines. As to the value requirement, the Fifth Circuit in
Fountainbleu held that a phone number is a "valuable asset."258 In
short, the number 1-800-RED-ARMS satisfies the well-defined asset
part of the analysis.
A phone number also complies with the second element of the
suggested solution, that the interest be exclusive. Analogous to the
domain name at issue in Kremen, registering a phone number "is like
staking a claim to a plot of land at the title office" because doing so
"informs others that the ... [number] is the registrant's and no one
else's."259 In fact, it was because the -entrepreneur had the right to
exclude the Red Cross from using 1-800-733-2767 that the FCC
stepped in and transferred the number. Therefore, a phone number
accommodates the exclusivity element.
Red Arms's phone number also accords with the last
constraint: that the interest contain a right of expectancy. Because a
phone number cannot be deleted or erased in any meaningful way and
does not diminish with time, it can be considered a lasting or
persistent interest. Moreover, a phone number is capable of being
relied upon through advertising and publicizing, such that a
subscriber expects to have a legitimate claim to use it indefinitely.
This idea was recognized explicitly by a Florida appellate court in
Clayton.260 Therefore, 1-800-RED-ARMS conforms to the claim of
expectancy requirement. Because the three elements of the test are
satisfied, Red Arms's phone number amounts to a cognizable form of
intangible property that should be protected by the Constitution under
the Fifth Amendment. In closing, under' the offered solution, the
government may transfer Red Arms's telephone number only after
256. Phone numbers, street addresses, email addresses, domain names, and screen names
are similar in this context; all can be classified as "entity locators." See Smith, supra note 15, at
1191.
257. "A utility company's tariffs do not establish conclusively the bounds of a debtor's
property interest." In re Sec. Inv. Props., Inc., 559 F.2d 1321, 1325 (5th Cir. 1977); see id.
(discussing bounded interest in a phone number).
258. In re Fontainebleau Hotel Corp., 508 F.2d 1056, 1059 (5th Cir. 1975).
259. Kremen v. Cohen, 337 F.3d 1024, 1030 (9th Cir. 2003).
260. Clayton Home Equip. Co. v. Fla. Tel. Corp., 152 So. 2d 203, 204 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1963); see supra Part III.A.2.b.
2007] 709
VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW
complying with the Takings Clause requirements of "public use" and
"just compensation. 261
V. CONCLUSION
When a new technology develops, a judicial struggle typically
ensues between tendencies to apply established legal doctrine strictly
and inclinations to expand the law to promote fairness. The ad hoc
inconsistency by which courts have developed legal doctrines
regarding intangible interests has left this area of the law alarmingly
disparate. Not only has the state of flux resulted in legal uncertainty,
but also a failure to protect certain emerging property interests
adequetely. The solution advanced in Part IV of this Note is a
universal test that could be used to settle this area of the law.
An obvious critique of this solution is that it amounts to
judicial activism in the absence of any statutory basis, and there are
persuasive reasons to leave this solution to the legislature rather than
the courts. However, courts have long been interpreting the
Constitution and are exceedingly familiar with the principles
underlying Takings Clause, perhaps more so than the legislative
branch. Especially in the interim, when few laws exist to protect
emerging, intangible interests, it is at least the partial responsibility
of the judicial branch to resolve disputes and defend consumer
expectations.
The proposed solution provides a way to readily administer
emerging property interests and meet consumer expectations of
ownership, without giving an incentive to property-grab intangible
rights. Adequately protecting intangible property without rewarding
opportunistic digi-squatters is profoundly difficult, but it is possible
and necessary in order to adhere to the protections afforded in the
Fifth Amendment. In fact, we have little choice.
262
Susan Eisenberg*
261. Although outside of the scope of this note, the issue of compensation raises additional
questions. Shouldn't the American Red Cross, rather than the government, compensate for the
phone number, since the Red Cross was the beneficiary? On the other hand, do we really want
charity donations used to compensate an opportunistic company for a phone number rather than
directly helping hurricane victims?
262. See Home Bldg. & Loan Ass'n. v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398, 483 (1934) (Sutherland, J.,
dissenting) ("If the provisions of the Constitution be not upheld when they pinch as well as when
they comfort, they may as well be abandoned.").
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